The process of separation between India and Chinese forces that began on Wednesday on both sides of Pangong Tso is only the first step. What started with the first talks in June 2020 took eight months, violence, death, negative steps to get here. The mistrust between the two sides is so deep that all deportation measures will have to be confirmed.
Defense Minister Rajnath Singh told Parliament on Thursday that the situation will be restored to what it was before that of the start of the war that happened last year.
Sources in the government said the ongoing talks between India and China have three key implications – first, the defense and defense institutions working together to achieve this goal.
While military officials held nine talks in the conflict zones, the MEA led consultation talks with joint secretary Naveen Srivastava conducting WMCC talks under the watchful eye of Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar.
Second, sources said it “did not proceed” to get the result. “Playing it cool and playing it for a long time, it was our advice. We did not make the coming winter a timeline. ”
This led to endless conversations, which were offline. On the Internet, the messages were consistent. Jaishankar led the effort, using every opportunity to say that peace and tranquility at the border were important to the whole relationship; China did not provide a satisfactory explanation for its actions in the spring of 2020; existing agreements must be followed in writing and in spirit.
He also told to the Institute of Chinese Studies recently that any expectation that they will be ignored, and that the life can go on without interruption even though the situation is on borderline, and that is not true. China’s foreign ministry has reiterated that the two will not be equal, but India has not yet resigned.
Separately, in this regard, India has indicated its commitment to ending bilateral relations by taking drastic measures to combat China’s economic and trade interests in India. Many of the steps to be taken will not be reviewed, especially in the area of telecommunications, FDI restrictions, etc.
In terms of strategy, India turned its back on the Indo-Pacific and Quad, including making Australia part of the Malabar exercise.
As one major project put it, “We wanted Beijing to ask itself,‘ who lost India? ’”
The third factor was to maintain military pressure on the Chinese. With unprecedented opposition deployments to the LAC east of Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, the Indian signs were clear.
The Galwan Valley violence on June 15 was a disaster in India, with 20 men losing their lives, but it ended up shocking the Chinese side.
A report by Russian state-run news agency TASS this week pointed to China’s loss of 45 men in the war. But it was India’s opposition in August-September 2020 that served as an important strategic advantage that India could effectively use in negotiations.
Sources said that after the confirmation and termination of the current cycle, both sides will begin negotiations on PP-15 and Gogra-Hot Springs. The next round of talks will involve the plains of Depsang, where the Chinese have banned Indians from surveillance.
On the question, why now, many viewers point to the new administration of Biden in Washington.
China’s increased stance on new US rulers may have forced the Chinese to remain firm. But it is now clear that Biden will take a more difficult approach to equality with China.
That may have prompted Beijing’s balance to finally resolve this frontier dispute.